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DSM-5, the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the 
American Psychiatric Association’s guide for mental health clinicians (though in fact widely-
used internationally), includes a significant revision to the diagnostic criteria for one of the 
most controversial conditions included within it: dissociative identity disorder. This 2013 
revision for the first time includes reference to experiences of spirit possession, as well as the 
more commonly understood fragmentation of the self still often referred to by the obsolete 
clinical name of multiple personality disorder (some clinicians, however, have long worked 
without drawing a clear distinction between the two: see Crabtree). The first criterion of the 
condition describes it thus: “Disruption of identity characterized by two or more distinct 
personality states, which may be described in some cultures as an experience of possession” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 155). The relative clause here is interesting: it reveals a 
willingness to acknowledge cultural difference in the experiences of atypical mental states, 
yet stops short of accepting an ontological difference between such experiences, instead 
suggesting that the distinction is perhaps no more than linguistic. Of course, we need not 
reduce the issue here to a choice between two dichotomous states, and only allow the 
difference between spirit possession and dissociative disorder to be either mere quibbling 
over the terms of description or a relativist division based on irreconcilable culturally-
constructed categories. Instead, recognizing that our labeling and concomitant comprehension 
of these ideas cannot be extricated from our cultural norms, it becomes particularly 
interesting to examine the ways in which these conditions are explored in diasporic, or 
transcultural, texts. This article looks to three recent novels published by African-British 
writers in order to see what use is being made of the discrepancy between the attribution of 
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spirit possession and that of dissociated identity.1 This investigation also enables us to 
examine some broader questions about the description of traumatic experience and its 
aftermath, and, particularly, to examine how contemporary novelists might manipulate the 
linguistic and social capital attached to the languages of trauma, exploiting the currency of 
clinical definitions, while refusing to grant any final authority over the definition of 
experience to a medical (or medicalized) hegemony.  
In 2007 Claire Stocks offered a critique of the cultural bias she found encoded in much 
of the trauma theory being propounded at the time. She locates the source of the problem in 
the typical psychoanalytic conception of the unified and autonomous self as the model of 
healthy mental functioning. This valorization of the individual ensures, for Stocks, that 
current conceptions of trauma are necessarily unable to deal usefully with cultures that 
operate with a more communally based notion of selfhood, as well as those for whom 
division is a lived reality. She uses W.E.B. Du Bois’s idea of African American double 
consciousness to demonstrate that “the notion of a single, coherent identity . . . may actually 
be incompatible with social or historical reality”, arguing that it is recognition of this duality, 
rather than its reparation, that constitutes the crucial step toward liberty:  
While the divided self may not be entirely unproblematical, the trauma 
theorists are inherently unable to reconcile multiplicity with mental health and 
their insistence on a return to an original state of psychic unity is at odds with 
the realisation and acceptance of duality that emerges as a result of liberation. 
(86) 
Stef Craps has responded to Stocks by suggesting that her reading of double consciousness 
incorrectly puts a positive spin on something Du Bois saw as a psychic wound, and that her 
                                                          
1 The descriptor ‘African-British’ is used in the loosest possible sense, without intending to impute similar 
relations to diasporic identity to these very different authors, and instead to signal that they each not only have 
experience of cultural life in both Africa and Britain, but have written novels that consciously engage in 
crossing this divide). 
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view “carelessly embraces [the negative psychological effects of double consciousness] 
rather than interpreting them as signs of the traumatic impact of subjugation on the socially 
devalued” (33). Craps’s argument is also a critique of some of the longstanding assumptions 
of trauma theory, but he wholly rejects Stocks’s suggestion that “division, fragmentation and 
multiplicity” could be seen as positive psychological states. Rather, he sees the traditional 
focus on the individual, and the simultaneous search for a particular traumatic event to 
explain subsequent symptoms, as at the heart of the problem with the expansion of trauma 
studies into a global phenomenon. For many communities who live through racism or 
political oppression, he insists, everyday life is traumatic and the event-based, individual 
model of trauma is insufficient to recognize this, with the result that “problems that are 
essentially political, social, or economic are medicalized, and the people affected by them are 
pathologized as victims without agency, sufferers from an illness that can be cured through 
psychological counselling” (28). Craps refuses to give up on the potential of trauma theory to 
explain the experiences of such groups, but recognizes that some of its central tenets may 
need revising.  
 Craps accepts that “it can be argued that the uncritical cross-cultural application of 
psychological concepts developed in the West amounts to a form of cultural imperialism” (2), 
but even in this statement we can detect his belief that a more critically aware use of these 
models may well be valid. Some of the tensions around the use of Western models of trauma 
in an African setting are explored in Aminatta Forna’s The Memory of Love (2010). In the 
novel, Adrian, a British clinical psychologist, has volunteered to work in post-conflict Sierra 
Leone, where his duties involve convening a therapy group for young men tortured by the 
memories of what they did as child soldiers during the 1991-2002 rebellion. The novel 
throughout addresses the question of to what degree only local knowledge and skills can 
adequately facilitate the reconstruction of the country, and whether international intervention 
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in this work too often fails to respect the specificity of local conditions. The failure to 
appreciate the necessary distinctiveness of the Sierra Leonean situation is satirized in 
Adrian’s wife’s continual verbal slips with the name of the country, instead referring to Sri 
Lanka, “where a civil war was also being fought, though on an entirely different continent” 
(66). Adrian continually finds that the locals expect a similar insensitivity to the specifics of 
place among the international aid workers, who will simply perform a set of pre-defined 
tasks, and then leave the population to cope on its own. A particularly stirring version of this 
position is articulated by Attila, who runs the psychiatric hospital in which Adrian is working. 
He questions the work that Adrian is doing with his therapy group, and undermines more 
generally the use of trauma to explain the situation of his country: 
“A few years back a medical team came here. […] They were here for six 
weeks. They sent me a copy of the paper. The conclusion they reached was 
that ninety-nine per cent of the population was suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder.” He laughs cheerlessly. “Post-traumatic stress disorder! […] 
You call it a disorder, my friend. We call it life.” (319)  
Attila cannot see the use of a diagnosis that offers so little towards understanding how the 
ongoing problems of the country might be resolved. When an entire population is 
traumatized, a model developed to identify and treat trauma as an abnormality simply seems 
to have little use.  
The anthropologists Good et al. have elaborated a distinction between different ways in 
which we talk about trauma that can usefully be applied to help work through some of the 
issues at stake regarding labeling here. Trauma, they note, is a concept that has become 
ubiquitous, but more than one meaning for the term may be in common circulation. It is used 
both “generically to describe acute suffering” as well as “clinically to describe the dynamics 
of individuals with overt psychopathology” (9). Each of these uses has its own particular 
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currency but it cannot be assumed that the meaning of the term within one discourse is 
identical to that within another. While “when used with technical precision clinical language 
has the potential to distinguish between normal human responses to loss and violence and 
those which represent more extreme or pathological ‘clinical’ responses” sometimes the term 
is useful to people precisely because it lacks precision within the contexts in which it is 
employed: “when used generically, clinical terms convey important meanings of lived 
experience” (10). These generic uses of the language are often as unsuited for use in the 
clinic as the precise language used there is in everyday life, but each meaning of trauma 
preserves its own validity. To describe the entire population of Sierra Leone as traumatized is 
in one sense a truism, and to label it so is to do no more than acknowledge the country’s 
recent history. Yet to offer this as a medicalized definition is implicitly to propose not only 
certain forms of treatment, but also a specific etiology that always remains attached to some 
degree to the individualist models of psychoanalysis that have dominated trauma studies. 
Attila sees both the truism and the clinical diagnosis as equally useless, even though he 
increasingly seems to accept the work that Adrian is doing.  
Interestingly, Adrian seems to show little interest in offering diagnoses of the men with 
whom he regularly works. Rather, he employs more of a formulation based approach, linking 
symptom with cause without displaying any particular urge to classify. In fact, Forna reveals 
him to possess some strong degree of aversion to diagnosis, even though we are shown that 
he gained much of his professional reputation for precisely that. Forna presents Adrian as the 
author of a paper that suggested the survivors of the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster off the coast 
of Scotland in 1988 were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and “what had 
previously not existed as a classified mental disease eight years earlier suddenly drew the 
attention of others in his field” (65). However, rather than feeling proud of his work, “he felt 
cold and anxious, as though he had foolishly revealed the whereabouts of something 
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precious” (65). The precise nature of Adrian’s anxiety is not elaborated, but it seems related 
to unease about the power exercised in the execution of a diagnosis. However, in another case 
presented to him, which provides the heart of one of the novel’s major sub-plots, Adrian 
seems fascinated precisely with the question of providing an accurate diagnosis. Early in the 
novel he meets Agnes, a woman who intermittently travels long distances across the country, 
but has no memory of doing so when, weeks or months later, she returns to her hometown 
and family. Adrian immediately finds her case compelling and as well as pursuing further 
information about her history (at great risk to his own safety), he also revises his knowledge 
of one of the less well-known dissociative disorders, fugue. The original fuguers were 
recorded in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, especially in France, and 
although very few recent cases of fugue had been recorded it remained a diagnosable 
dissociative condition (in fact, one of the revisions in DSM-5 in 2013 has been to declassify it 
as a coherent disease entity in its own right, instead subsuming it under the more general 
category of dissociative amnesia). Adrian seems determined definitively to classify Agnes as 
suffering from fugue, and in doing so to identify a “properly” psychopathological condition 
which stands out from the general trauma of her compatriots.  
The clinical definition pursued by Adrian is not, however, the only classification 
offered in the novel for Agnes’s behavior. The man who brings her to the mental hospital 
tells Adrian that many people consider her to be possessed, but that he personally regards her 
as “crossed” (114). When Adrian questions the chief nurse, Salia, about the meaning of this 
latter term, he is first told that it is just another way of talking about possession, though Salia 
later reluctantly elaborates:  
“If a spirit possesses you, you become another person, it is a bad thing  . . . . 
But sometimes a person may be able to cross back and forth between this 
world and the spirit world. That is to say, a living person, a real person. And 
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when they are in between the worlds, in neither world, then we say they are 
crossed.” (129)  
This then is a local explanation for what is happening to Agnes, quite distinct from the 
“Western” model Adrian seems so keen to employ. Yet it is given very little space in the 
novel and is never seriously proposed as a more useful way to understand Agnes’s plight. As 
the novel progresses the narrative focus gradually shifts from Adrian to the locally-raised 
surgeon, Kai. Often seeming as cynical as anyone else about Adrian’s presence in the 
country, Kai seems to validate the idea that it is local solutions that need to be found for what 
has happened in Sierra Leone and he eventually decides to remain in the country, while 
Adrian leaves. As well as taking over the focalization of the novel, Kai also adopts Adrian’s 
quest to find out what happened to Agnes in the past. Eventually he discovers the truth: that 
Agnes’s daughter has unknowingly married the man who murdered her father, and that 
Agnes, who does know the truth, is forced to live with them. Following these revelations, Kai 
looks up the definition of fugue in Adrian’s books. He believes that it is an accurate 
description of what has happened to Agnes, though Adrian had mistakenly thought her to be 
looking for something on her wanderings, rather than escaping from her torturous home life. 
Despite Kai’s reservations about the value of importing foreign intellectual models to his 
country--“This is the way Europeans talk, as though everyone shared their experiences”, he 
thinks bitterly during one conversation with Adrian (182)--Forna’s conclusions in fact seem 
to endorse a rather conservative Western model of trauma: the “local” explanation which 
insists on spirit worlds is in practice dismissed, and the medicalized model instead prevails 
(though it must be internalized and articulated by a local, rather than an incomer). Also, in 
Agnes’s unusual symptoms, the distinctiveness of event-based trauma is reasserted as 
something different than the everyday horror of life in a war zone. 
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An arresting image early in The Memory of Love captures Adrian’s bookshelf: 
“standing at the end of the uneven row of paperbacks is a neat group of thicker volumes”, 
including the DSM and other clinical tomes (64). The contrast between the ordered medical 
knowledge and the more unruly other books (which we might assume to be fiction) is 
noticeable, yet there seem to be few ways in which Forna’s fiction significantly disrupts or 
displaces a standard model of trauma. Craps has noted that many novels dealing with recent 
military conflict in Africa show a clear “reliance on a no-frills, realist aesthetic, which sets 
them apart from the emerging canon of trauma literature” (42). He suggests that this is 
because of their political, consciousness-raising concerns, but this stylistic decision may have 
some other effects. Not least, it seems to restrict the ability fully to explore the type of 
explanation that may include reference to a spirit world. Works that wish more thoroughly to 
tread this path seem to be required to turn away somewhat from the conventions of realism.   
It is interesting also to note that the move towards incorporating the possibility of spirit 
possession into explorations of dissociation can serve also to sever it, at least in part, from its 
connection with trauma. In Ian Hacking’s study of fugue, he notes that the condition’s 
association with trauma is a fairly recent phenomenon, which he associates particularly with 
the efforts of David Spiegel, who chaired the DSM’s committee on dissociative disorders 
(Mad Travellers, 82-84). He questions many of the conclusions drawn by Spiegel and his 
colleagues, not least in their retrospective ascription of trauma to the early French fuguers 
(Hacking points out that, although many of them were soldiers, they tended to be barracked 
rather than in combat zones and their symptoms were most often “associated with boredom, 
not fear” (85)). Hacking’s more general concern is to demonstrate that “whatever ailed these 
patients (and they were ailing!), the manifestations, the marks of their illness were entirely 
socially conditioned” (12): he does not deny the reality of illness, but rather seeks to establish 
that the understanding of mental illness (for the sufferer as much as the onlooker) is 
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conditioned always by the ways in which they are diagnosed and treated by a clinical 
establishment. These arguments are more famously elaborated in his earlier study of multiple 
personality disorder, Rewriting the Soul, where he carefully works through the suggestion 
that although the experience of multiple personality is genuinely experienced by sufferers, 
and cannot simply be explained by seeing it as iatrogenically created through the patient’s 
interaction with a clinician, there nonetheless remains an element of “false consciousness” in 
the process, in which patient and clinician accept an explanation which may not objectively 
describe the phenomena witnessed. 
Helen Oyeyemi’s The Icarus Girl (2005) tells the story of Jessamy (Jess) Harrison, a 
prepubescent girl living in London with her English father and Nigerian mother. From the 
outset, Jess is highly strung, imaginative, and prone to disruptiveness at school. Her parents 
take her on a trip to Nigeria where she meets her mother’s family for the first time. She finds 
many aspects of the vacation troubling, not least the way in which her father is treated as an 
outsider, but is particularly disturbed by her grandfather calling her by her “African” name, 
Wuraola. She struggles to understand “why her mum allowed some people to call her Sarah, 
and others to call her Adebisi” (21), but is particularly challenged by her own renaming: 
“should she … become Wuraola?” (20). The first glimmers of a fragmented self begin to 
appear. Soon after this she meets a girl she calls TillyTilly, who then accompanies her back to 
England, where it becomes clear that no-one can see this new friend. Her relationship with 
the destructive TillyTilly grows increasingly fraught and eventually TillyTilly begins to “take 
over” Jess, displacing her own personality. Dr McKenzie, the psychologist to whom Jess is 
taken, seems particularly keen to diagnose a dissociative disorder, describing TillyTilly as 
Jess’s “alter ego” (260). An earlier discussion in the psychologist’s office suggests that the 
manifestation of this alter might be related to Jess’s difficulty in accepting her mother’s 
characterization of her dual self: “‘It’s not a matter of me wanting you to be Nigerian--you 
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are, you just are! . . . When Jess looked at her, she continued, ‘You’re English too, duh. And 
it’s OK’.” (242). Another explanation that focuses on uncertain belonging is given, in less 
friendly terms, by the class bully: “‘Maybe Jessamy has all these attacks because she can’t 
make up her mind whether she’s black or white!’” (82). 
 Dissociative disorder as a result of the everyday trauma brought about by the struggles 
of living through the unsettling experience of diaspora and mixed-race identity might then 
seem to be the appropriate medical diagnosis for Jess’s behaviour. However, the coherence of 
this explanation is challenged when we learn that Jess had a twin sister, Fern, who died in 
childbirth. Jess, her mother declares, is abiku, a spirit child who will inevitably be haunted by 
spirits unless and until an ibeji carving is made to appease the dead twin (165). The family 
return to Nigeria, where the carving is made. Following a car accident which leaves Jess in a 
coma, she undertakes a dreamlike journey through the “wilderness”, at the end of which she 
enters TillyTilly’s body and goes “back into herself”; the novel ends with her waking “up and 
up and up and up” (302). Although Christopher Ouma has noted that the dual explanatory 
framework offered for Jess’s ailments complicates and intensifies her psychic splitting (265), 
it can seem that the end of the novel asserts most strongly the validity of the abiku 
interpretation. This is certainly the reading given by Pilar Cuder-Domínguez, who sees Jess’s 
grandfather’s intervention in commissioning the ibeji carving as providing for Jess “the key 
to actively deconstruct and reconcile in herself the tensions between British and Nigerian 
identities” (285). However, as Diana Adesola Mafe observes, the ending of the novel 
“perhaps belies such a tidy resolution” (32). Mafe draws attention to how Jess seems required 
to take on much of TillyTilly’s violence in order to defeat her, but the ending also fails fully 
to explain the actual splitting/possession--it is clear that TillyTilly is not Fern, but a separate 
malevolent spirit, and no real justification is given for why she torments Jess. This ambiguity 
is important for allowing the dissociative reading still to haunt the text. While Jess’s abiku 
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status might partially explain the manifestation of her illness, the trauma-based reading that 
locates her “in-betweenness” as the source of her breakdown is not wholly dismissed.  
Jess herself is sceptical of the value of any explanation: “with her mother, it always 
seems to be about reasons. Why, why, why? Didn’t she know that knowing why didn’t make 
things any less scary?” (169). In fact, explanation itself seems to be one of the contributing 
factors to her condition. The idea of trauma is further complicated in the novel by the terms in 
which it is rendered. The call for Jess to simultaneously live as both English and Nigerian is a 
demand that she internalize contradiction. In fact, all the main adult characters in the novel 
seem to embody contradiction in their own lives: her mother rejects Christianity because of 
its portrayal of a white-faced Jesus (214), yet switches from studying medicine to English 
literature, causing the grandfather to rail against such imperialist indoctrination (26); he in 
turn insists on adherence to Christianity, yet turns to a “witchdoctor” at a time of crisis (294); 
and Jess’s pacifist father hits her so hard “that she jerked backward with a whole-body snap” 
(232).  The demand made of Jess seems to be that she embrace this contradiction 
characteristic of the adult world; her trauma arises because of her unwillingness to do so. In 
fact, she frequently dispels contradictions and challenges many of the assumptions about the 
burdens of mixed-race identity--reflecting on her mother’s rejection of Jesus because of his 
skin color, she tentatively offers that “faces don’t matter?” (214), while she concludes a 
discussion about the Eurocentric beauty ideal that her mother sees as represented by Barbie 
dolls by noting that “‘They’re only dolls, I s’pose. I wouldn’t mind one” (121). There is a 
persistent sense that her trauma, her symptoms, and her “cure” are all generated by the adult 
world into which she must be interpellated. Hacking’s dissatisfaction with the false 
consciousness generated by multiple personality therapy seems to have a parallel here. 
Oyeyemi, then, offers the explanatory frameworks of both traumatic dissociation and spirit 
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possession but seems reluctant to commit to the authenticity of either. A similar technique is 
explored more thoroughly in Brian Chikwava’s Harare North (2009).  
Roger Luckhurst’s The Trauma Question looks to expand what he sees as an emerging 
canon of “trauma fiction”, within which particular narrative strategies are inevitably deployed 
in order to capture the specific manifestations of traumatic damage. He looks to a much 
broader range of cultural texts to capture how trauma manifests in diverse narrative forms, 
arguing that the direction of contemporary criticism has caused “the aesthetic means to 
convey the singularity of a traumatic aporia [to] become highly conventionalized, the 
narratives and tropes of traumatic fiction easily identified” (89). By broadening the types of 
narratives under consideration, he aims to come to a better understanding of how “trauma has 
become a paradigm because it has been turned into a repertoire of compelling stories about 
the enigmas of identity, memory and selfhood that have saturated Western cultural life” (80). 
A parallel, though distinct, investigation to Luckhurst’s tracing of the ubiquity of trauma 
across diverse narrative forms can instead trace how the now-established conventions of 
representing trauma can become uncoupled from the need for any pre-existent traumatic 
experience. This requires us to stop thinking about the literary devices used to represent 
trauma and instead to posit trauma as itself a literary device. Doing so does not deny the fact 
of trauma, or even deplore its current moral weighting, as the authors of The Empire of 
Trauma would have us do. Rather, it builds upon their observation that “trauma operates as a 
screen between the event and its context on one hand, and the subject and meaning he or she 
gives to the situation on the other” and recognises that if “trauma obliterates experience” 
(Fassin and Rechtman 281), then we may have a justification in reading the afterlife of the 
trauma aesthetic, once traumatic experience is removed from the equation. Anne Whitehead, 
a critic who has done much to develop the association of trauma fiction with particular 
narrative devices, notes how Binjamin Wilkomirski’s “fake” Holocaust memoir establishes 
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its authenticity by building intertextual links to previous examples of the form (39-42). If the 
narrative conventions that constitute the recall of traumatic memory can be deployed 
autonomously of the actual memory, then it surely follows that they can be used in ways that 
refuse the ascription of trauma at all. This displacement is enacted successfully in such 
African-British texts as Oyeyemi’s and Chikwava’s through the authors’ recourse to the 
languages of spirit possession. These texts do not turn to possession in order to replace the 
trauma paradigm with another explanatory model, but rather to demonstrate the instability of 
each interpretative framework. They are not positing an African experience as more authentic 
than Western models, even if Oyeyemi’s novel can seem at times to suggest this, but drawing 
on their dual heritage to create narratives that refuse reduction to a single model of being.   
 The title of Harare North signals an act of translation, a determination to relocate the 
Zimbabwean capital to London. The novel rarely travels far from Brixton but an African 
present, or very recent past, is never far from the text. A tension between London and 
Zimbabwe is built into not only Chikwava’s content, but also at the level of form. The 
unnamed narrator arrives in London on the first page of the novel and immediately claims 
asylum, telling British immigration officers that he has fled for his life from Zimbabwe, 
where he was being threatened as a member of the opposition to Robert Mugabe’s rule. He 
feels a little guilty about this as he does not want to disrespect the President: he is a loyal 
supporter of Mugabe. In fact, we learn that he has actually fled the country because he fears 
reprisals related to his past as a Green Bomber―the groups of young men who made it their 
business to terrorise supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change, and anyone else 
they felt to be a traitor to the nation. Their Commanding Officer tells them that the best form 
of forgiveness for traitors is punishment, so it is “forgiveness” in the form of beatings and 
murder that they deal out to those on whom they call (19). The word gets quickly dislocated 
from its original meaning and is used from then on in the novel only to indicate its usual 
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opposite. We learn quickly therefore to be very careful with what is said: the narrator is 
chronically, constitutionally unreliable. After a very short time spent in detention he is 
released and collected by his cousin’s wife, Sekai. He dislikes Sekai from the start, feeling 
that she neglects many of the traditional rites of hospitality with which she should be 
welcoming him as a family member. He labels her a “lapsed African” (5): someone who no 
longer recognises the values of her culture and has instead allowed a British mentality to 
pervert her attitudes. It is important to the narrator that he maintains his connection to where 
he comes from, and that he retains the dignity that will allow him to do so. We learn that the 
worst kind of lapsed Africans are the BBCs, the British Bum Cleaners in old people’s nursing 
homes, doing menial and “pooful” work (41). Sociologists of migration have note how the 
journey from Zimbabwe to Britain frequently entails the loss of many of the markers of 
identity that might grant migrants a secure sense of themselves (Ndlovu) and the narrator’s 
determination not to “lapse” could seem a useful psychic defence, but Chikwava’s narrative 
does not allow it to operate in this way. 
The narrator recognizes that he might serve as an uncomfortable reminder to Sekai of 
where she comes from, that he might seem to her to be mamhepo: the winds or bad spirits 
that return to haunt wrongdoers. The justice sought by the wronged dead is an oft-noted trope 
in traditional Shona culture, and the figure of the ngozi is an important one: ngozi are the 
spirits of the dead, who are unable to find rest and instead return to torment those who have 
wronged them (the wrong can take a number of forms, but it commonly manifests as the 
ngozi harassing the person who caused their death). If recompense is not made to the victim’s 
family, then the ngozi may enact the ultimate price and take the life of their own murderer 
(Gelfand 69-74). There are recurrent reports in Zimbabwe of the ngozi of murdered MDC 
activists returning to haunt ZANU PF killers (see Movement for Democratic Change). The 
ngozi will frequently take possession of someone close to their victim, or the victim 
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themselves, the angry spirit taking over from the individual. Ranka Primorac suggests that 
Chikwava’s use of such figures shows him “insert[ing] himself into the long Zimbabwean 
literary tradition of operating within the trope of spirit possession” (253), but his relation to 
tradition is perhaps not straightforward. In Maurice Vambe’s exploration of the trope of spirit 
possession in the Zimbabwean novel in English he finds three main uses. Firstly, it can figure 
as a trace of the “clandestine reality” which Africans possess alongside “Western” ways of 
reading their situations, an older spiritual understanding that has never gone away. Secondly, 
it can be read to operate metaphorically or metonymically to represent all those distinct 
practices “through which they have recreated themselves and kept themselves alive”. Finally, 
particularly when it is deployed in the novel, spirit possession can offer a way to explore the 
relations between Africa’s pasts and its present. All three of these meanings -- the spiritual, 
the metaphorical, and that which we could name the tropological -- are hinted at in Harare 
North, but none of them are ultimately allowed to stand, though the third way of reading 
perhaps puts in the strongest claim for consideration.  
Interestingly, the word ngozi is never actually used in Chikwava’s novel, though the 
mamhepo, the wind that brings the spirits, is mentioned on several occasions. Wind more 
generally, however, is constantly present, blowing into the narrator’s thoughts, reminding us 
in this repetition that something sinister might be carried from Africa. The narrator soon 
leaves his cousins and takes up residence in a squat in Brixton, with his friend Shingi, who he 
has known since childhood. On his first arrival at the house, the way the building is described 
is particularly arresting:  
It look like one heap of bricks that stands out from the other houses because of 
its grey brick. That’s the house where Shingi live. It have two top windows 
that have red brick arch. That make the windows look like big sad eyes. Below 
them sad eyes there is one large bay window that stick out like nose. When I 
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look at the nose, the eyes and black parapet wall--this is Shingi straight and 
square. But you can’t tell anyone that they head look like house if you still 
want to be friends.  
So, Shingi live inside this head? (29) 
Our narrator then takes up residence in the house that is Shingi’s head. The idea of spirit 
possession, of the avenging spirit taking up residence in its victim, begins to crystalize. 
Further hints in this direction are provided soon after when the Zimbabwean acting as 
landlord of the house, Aleck, teases Shingi that he is being pursued by mamhepo (47). Before 
that, the narrator and Shingi play games and the narrator always wins: “I possess him. I still 
possess him” (38). It seems that we may be offered here an interpretative key to read this 
complicated novel: our narrator is himself a ngozi, come to London to enact a revenge on 
Shingi for his past crimes. Yet although Chikwava teases us with this interpretation, it 
ultimately fails fully to work. Shingi has been to prison, we learn, because of killing someone 
in a rage--but our narrator does not seem to be that victim. His history as a Green Bomber 
does not fit into this narrative. He also never identifies to the reader as the spirit, and the 
ngozi of tradition is always aware of his or her own desires and aims. Perhaps most 
importantly, when Shingi does suffer a violent demise, stabbed in an alleyway and 
hospitalized, possibly killed, no peace comes to our narrator. If anything, he finds life harder. 
Reading him as ngozi does not quite add up. Returning to interpret the line “So, Shingi live 
inside this head?” differently, we may decide to read the situation the other way round and 
see Shingi as the possessing ngozi and our narrator his victim. Certainly his Green Bomber 
past would suggest he has far more blood on his hands than his friend. There is also play with 
recompense that would fit with the typical ngozi story--the narrator is increasingly bothered 
by letters and texts from Shingi’s family asking for money, which he refuses to give. We 
might read Shingi’s departure from the plot as the calming of this angry spirit, able to leave 
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the narrator alone on his descent into madness at the end of the novel. But this version of the 
narrative also fails fully to convince--that the narrator explicitly signals his possession of 
Shingi is just one place where a straightforward idea of Shingi as the ngozi falls down.  
Although the possession narrative seems most strongly signaled in the novel, Chikwava 
does provide another possible key to reading what is happening. Following the departure of 
Aleck from the house, Shingi and the narrator are joined by two British down-and-outs. One 
of them, Jenni, is immediately struck by the fact that Shingi talks about himself in the third 
person, and later accuses him directly--“‘You have DID. It’s funny. It’s weird; I know a 
woman that used to do that. She was suffering from DID’.” (163). The narrator offers no 
comment, failing no doubt to recognize the initials of dissociative identity disorder, the 
creation of multiple selves in response to a traumatic event. Reading the novel as a case of 
dissociation--“Shingi lives inside this head?”--can seem to offer further insights. The narrator 
possesses Shingi’s passport, and uses it to help him find work: on the one occasion he names 
himself in the novel, when taking on a new job, it is as Shingi. The letter from begging 
relatives are addressed to Shingi, but it is he who answers them, signing off as Shingi. When 
he returns to the house after Shingi’s departure from the novel he imagines telling his friend 
that “your room still full of disorder” (192). The room is untidy, but the word is significant, 
its clinical resonances furthering Chikwava’s hints in this direction. Of course, the rambling 
Jenni may not seem the best source to trust in the novel, but this is not the only time we are 
asked to evaluate Jenni’s judgments. Late in the novel we find out that the narrator is 
convinced he has AIDS, because of the test he took on leaving prison. The results were clear: 
HIV negative. Jenni tells him that this means he is all clear, but he cannot accept this. 
Negative means bad, he reasons, she must be wrong (211). Like forgiveness standing in for 
punishment, a word can come to mean its opposite. The narrator’s partiality of perspective 
perhaps means that he cannot see something that is obvious to Jenni. Chikwava teases the 
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readers of Harare North, offering just enough to suggest an interpretation, but never enough 
to confirm it.  
In a recent interview Chikwava was asked whether coming to Britain required “a big 
shift” in his thinking: 
I’m still going through that shift. I’m not through it yet. I feel almost like I’m 
in limbo, neither here nor there. I don’t belong to Zimbabwe anymore and I 
don’t belong here. It’s still a new place and, until I’m able to inhabit its 
culture, to find my way around it and read all its signifiers, I won’t be fully 
here. (Kociejowski 59).  
Harare North challenges us to read signifiers correctly, but reminds us that the “correct” 
reading is always a partial one. It is possible that an enterprising critic might be able to find a 
way to piece together the contradictory clues that Chikwava spreads throughout the novel--it 
might, for instance, be instructive to note that the term manhepo can be used in a non-
spiritual sense to refer to mental episodes where a person displays unexpected behavioral 
disturbances akin to hysteria (Patel 1294)--but the purpose of the extended speculative 
readings of the novel given above is to indicate that such an approach would likely be 
misguided. There is no clear originary trauma or social wrong presented in the text that 
allows for the certain positing of an interpretative framework of either dissociation or spirit 
possession to explain the novel. The philosopher Jennifer Redden has noted than questions 
posed about the idea of the breakup of the self in dissociative identity disorders “seem to 
require and presuppose the concepts and fabric of modernism” and that acceptance of the 
postmodernist idea of always already fragmented selves makes such ideas difficult to 
formulate (7). Chikwava uses his own sense of displacement as a diasporic subject to reveal 
the instability of any totalizing mode of explanation. While Forna’s The Memory of Love 
makes a plea for the local understanding of the manifestation of trauma, but ultimately 
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conforms to largely traditional idea of trauma, we can see in Oyeyemi’s The Icarus Girl and, 
far more distinctly, in Chikwava’s Harare North an urge to occupy the languages of trauma 
but to refuse the final ascription of a traumatic reality “behind” the text. The use of spirit 
possession as a counter-trope serves not to propose an “African” understanding that should 
eclipse the “Western” view, but rather to show the insufficiency of each view. Dissociation 
becomes a narrative tool that questions the very authority of the models of traumatic 
experience that explain dissociated states. These novels do not validate Stocks’s assertion that 
actual mental fragmentation may be a desirable state, but instead refuse any clinical 
interpretation and split the narrative potential of the trauma aesthetic from trauma’s clinical 
diagnosis altogether.  
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